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A malicious MCP server probed cloud credentials

Written November 5, 2026

A Markdown toolkit MCP server probed Alibaba metadata credentials. What the advisory shows, and what to check before installing any MCP server.

What the advisory shows

The package is @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp, and the affected versions are 2.0.9 and 2.1.1. The GitHub security advisory, published November 4, 2026, lists no patched version. The package advertises itself as a Markdown toolkit MCP server — table-of-contents generation, word count, table formatting — but its main entry runs a routine called imdsAudit() unconditionally at module load, before any Markdown tool is ever called.

That routine probes the Alibaba Cloud instance metadata service at http://100.100.100.200, enumerating the RAM and IAM security-credentials endpoints (/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/ and /latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/) through both the unauthenticated v1 path and the token-authenticated v2 path. On Alibaba Cloud, those endpoints return temporary role-scoped access keys. The harvested results — which can include live IAM credentials, instance ID, hostname, VPC ID, and private IPv4 address — are written to stdout and to output/imds_audit.txt.

The stdout part is what makes this worse than a local probe. Under an MCP server, stdout is the transport channel back to the MCP client and model, so the harvested credentials travel beyond the local machine. The code comments describe the behaviour as a benign audit with no network return, which conflicts with both the package's declared Markdown purpose and where the harvested data actually goes. Credential enumeration has nothing to do with any documented function of a Markdown toolkit.

Check before installing any MCP server

An MCP server runs code with your machine's reach, and there is no install-time check that would have caught this one. These steps work from the published code and the advisory — do not install this package to test it, because installing it runs the probe.

  1. Read the server's code before installing it. Open the package's main entry point and look for anything that runs at load time, before any tool is called. A Markdown toolkit has no reason to touch a cloud metadata address such as 100.100.100.200 or 169.254.169.254; a metadata probe in unrelated code is a reason to stop.
  2. Check the publisher and the version. Look at who published the package, when the version appeared, and whether the version you are about to install is the one the advisory names. Pin the exact version you inspected, so an update cannot swap in different code under the same install command.
  3. Compare the code with the description. The advisory's package described itself as Markdown tooling while its code enumerated cloud credentials. If the code does things the description never mentions, treat the description as unproven and the code as the truth.
  4. Run new servers with least privilege. Give a server only the filesystem paths, network access, and credentials its documented tools need. A server that only formats tables does not need cloud credentials, and least privilege is what keeps a bad server from reaching them.
  5. Watch what a new server sends. After installing a server, look at its network traffic and its output. Unexpected requests to a metadata address, or credentials appearing in output, are a signal to remove the server and rotate any credentials it could have reached.
  6. If the affected versions are already installed, remove them and rotate credentials. Versions 2.0.9 and 2.1.1 of @ifasn/ms-doc-mcp have no patched version to upgrade to. Removal alone does not undo credentials that were already exposed, so treat any credentials reachable from that machine as exposed and rotate them.

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Sources

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