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GitHub blocks pull_request_target workflows on December 2

Written November 4, 2026

Public-repo workflows using pull_request_target with write access stop working December 2, with brownouts November 9 and 16. Check yours in evaluate mode now.

What changes, and when

Starting 2 December 2026, GitHub Actions will block pull_request_target events by default in all public repositories, unless an applicable Actions event policy explicitly allows them. Enforcement was previously scheduled for 2 November 2026. The rule was introduced through workflow execution protections and initially runs in evaluate mode, so you can see which workflow runs it would block before enforcement begins. This change applies to public repositories on GitHub Free, GitHub Team, and GitHub Enterprise Cloud — not GitHub Enterprise Server. Private and internal repositories are not affected.

Before permanent enforcement, GitHub will temporarily enforce the default protection during two scheduled brownouts:

During each window, pull_request_target workflow attempts blocked by the default rule in affected public repositories will create failed runs with an error annotation, and the workflows will not execute. After each window, the default rule returns to evaluate mode, allowing workflows to run with warnings.

Why pull_request_target is different

Workflows triggered by pull_request_target run with elevated trust: the job receives the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN and access to repository and organization secrets. That trust is safe only because the workflow file comes from the base repository's default branch, not from the pull request. The risk appears when a workflow checks out the fork's code — for example, checking out the pull request head and then running make test — because the next step executes code from the pull request with the base repository's secrets and token. That pattern is known as a pwn request, and GitHub's docs name it as the root cause of multiple supply-chain compromises. The default block exists to stop that pattern from running silently in public repositories.

Check yours before the first brownout

  1. Use Insights before 9 November. In evaluate mode, workflow runs continue, but policy Insights identify the runs the rule would block after enforcement. Review them to find every workflow that uses pull_request_target and would be blocked.
  2. Decide per workflow whether pull_request_target is still required. If a workflow does not need secrets or write access, update it to use the safer pull_request event, which runs the workflow from the pull request's merge commit with a read-only token and no access to other secrets.
  3. If a workflow must keep pull_request_target, allow it explicitly. Create or update an applicable Actions event policy that explicitly allows pull_request_target, using workflow file targeting to allow specific workflows rather than opening the event for the whole repository.
  4. If you do not want to allow it, leave the default policy in place. After enforcement, GitHub will block workflows triggered by that event. That is the safe outcome for a workflow nobody needs.
  5. Do not treat a clean evaluate-mode result as a safety verdict. Evaluate mode tells you which runs would be blocked. It does not inspect the workflow's checkout ref, commands, token permissions, or secret use — a workflow that survives the block can still be unsafe if it checks out and executes fork code.

Scope limits to get right

Limits

Related playbooks

Sources

Back to: Coding playbooks hub · Also: Lock down agent-built GitHub Actions workflows · Audit a repository's git config before any agent opens it