Playbooks · Coding tasks
GitHub blocks pull_request_target workflows on December 2
Written November 4, 2026
Public-repo workflows using pull_request_target with write access stop working December 2, with brownouts November 9 and 16. Check yours in evaluate mode now.
What changes, and when
Starting 2 December 2026, GitHub Actions will block pull_request_target events by default in all public repositories, unless an applicable Actions event policy explicitly allows them. Enforcement was previously scheduled for 2 November 2026. The rule was introduced through workflow execution protections and initially runs in evaluate mode, so you can see which workflow runs it would block before enforcement begins. This change applies to public repositories on GitHub Free, GitHub Team, and GitHub Enterprise Cloud — not GitHub Enterprise Server. Private and internal repositories are not affected.
Before permanent enforcement, GitHub will temporarily enforce the default protection during two scheduled brownouts:
- 9 November 2026, 16:00–18:00 UTC
- 16 November 2026, 16:00–18:00 UTC
During each window, pull_request_target workflow attempts blocked by the default rule in affected public repositories will create failed runs with an error annotation, and the workflows will not execute. After each window, the default rule returns to evaluate mode, allowing workflows to run with warnings.
Why pull_request_target is different
Workflows triggered by pull_request_target run with elevated trust: the job receives the base repository's GITHUB_TOKEN and access to repository and organization secrets. That trust is safe only because the workflow file comes from the base repository's default branch, not from the pull request. The risk appears when a workflow checks out the fork's code — for example, checking out the pull request head and then running make test — because the next step executes code from the pull request with the base repository's secrets and token. That pattern is known as a pwn request, and GitHub's docs name it as the root cause of multiple supply-chain compromises. The default block exists to stop that pattern from running silently in public repositories.
Check yours before the first brownout
- Use Insights before 9 November. In evaluate mode, workflow runs continue, but policy Insights identify the runs the rule would block after enforcement. Review them to find every workflow that uses
pull_request_targetand would be blocked. - Decide per workflow whether
pull_request_targetis still required. If a workflow does not need secrets or write access, update it to use the saferpull_requestevent, which runs the workflow from the pull request's merge commit with a read-only token and no access to other secrets. - If a workflow must keep
pull_request_target, allow it explicitly. Create or update an applicable Actions event policy that explicitly allowspull_request_target, using workflow file targeting to allow specific workflows rather than opening the event for the whole repository. - If you do not want to allow it, leave the default policy in place. After enforcement, GitHub will block workflows triggered by that event. That is the safe outcome for a workflow nobody needs.
- Do not treat a clean evaluate-mode result as a safety verdict. Evaluate mode tells you which runs would be blocked. It does not inspect the workflow's checkout ref, commands, token permissions, or secret use — a workflow that survives the block can still be unsafe if it checks out and executes fork code.
Scope limits to get right
- Existing policies are untouched. The default policy does not replace an applicable event policy you have already configured, and on 2 December GitHub will enforce the default policy only for affected repositories that were using the default
pull_request_targetpolicy before general availability. - Private and internal repositories are out of scope, as is GitHub Enterprise Server. If your repositories are all private, this change does not block anything — but the pwn-request risk in the docs still applies to any
pull_request_targetworkflow that executes fork code with secrets. - Keeping the trigger demands controls. GitHub's docs advise restricting the
GITHUB_TOKENto the least privileges needed, using only the necessary secrets, keeping compute isolated and ephemeral on self-hosted runners, and never executing checked-out pull request code with secrets or a privileged token. Workflows triggered bypull_request_targetalso have read-only cache access in the default branch's scope: they can restore cache entries but cannot create or overwrite them.
Limits
- Evaluate mode shows which runs the default rule would block. It does not audit whether a workflow that is explicitly allowed is safe to run.
- An explicitly allowed
pull_request_targetworkflow remains high-risk: any step that checks out, downloads, or otherwise fetches fork code and then executes it can expose secrets, even if the workflow file itself comes from the default branch.
Related playbooks
- The Nov 16 pull_request_target brownout, in UTC
- Run a reasoning task on a schedule with GitHub Agentic Workflows: one Markdown file, one reviewed pull request
- Review a pull request with a coding agent
- GitHub Agentic Workflows are now GA
Sources
- https://github.blog/changelog/2026-11-02-pull_request_target-blocked-by-default-december-2/
- https://docs.github.com/en/actions/reference/security/securely-using-pull_request_target
Back to: Coding playbooks hub · Also: Lock down agent-built GitHub Actions workflows · Audit a repository's git config before any agent opens it