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Two gh-aw advisories: tokens and temp files

Written November 8, 2026

GitHub Agentic Workflows shipped two advisories: a Copilot credential misrouted and echoed, and temp files that leak progress data. The fixes.

What happened

GitHub published two security advisories for gh-aw, the GitHub Agentic Workflows tool, on November 5. Both are fixed in version 1.2.0. If you run gh-aw, the fix for each is the same first step: upgrade to 1.2.0 or later, then recompile your workflows so the generated lock files pick up the patched runtime.

Advisory one: the Copilot token goes to OpenAI

GHSA-vc9g-q5h8-x44c, rated medium, affects gh-aw up to and including 0.92.0. For engines with provider-env-mode: universal-llm-consumer and a copilot/ model, the compiler sets OPENAI_API_KEY to the Copilot credential — secrets.COPILOT_GITHUB_TOKEN, or github.token under copilot-requests: write. The workflow runtime then enables its OpenAI adapter and sends the token as a bearer token to https://api.openai.com/v1/models three times per run.

OpenAI answers 401, and the 401 response echoes the first 8 and last 4 characters of the key. That echo lands in upstream-errors.jsonl, which is uploaded in the run's agent artifact — so on a public repository, the fragments are public. The advisory's own proof is a gh-aw smoke run from October 19, where the log shows the OpenAI adapter enabled and the models fetch returning 401.

The affected engines are the shared aider, crush, goose, opencode and deepseek-harness definitions, plus external definitions such as the pydantic-ai harness. The built-in copilot, claude, gemini, codex, and pi engines are not affected. A definition cannot work around it by setting its own environment: the compiler copies the credential into the agent step after the definition's own environment is copied.

Advisory two: a predictable temp file keeps loose permissions

GHSA-796w-fvw2-ccmp, rated high, affects gh-aw up to and including 0.2.0. The function that writes MCP compile progress, writeMCPCompileProgress(), writes to a predictable path — the progress file's name plus .tmp — using Go's os.WriteFile without exclusive creation. When that .tmp file already exists, the kernel ignores the permission argument, so a pre-existing file with permissive mode (for example 0o644) keeps its world-readable permissions through the write and the rename into place. Sensitive compile progress data meant to be restricted to 0o600 stays world-readable. A pre-staged symlink at the .tmp path is followed during the write, so it can also overwrite other files.

The advisory notes this was an incomplete fix: an October 25 commit had already tried to repair the permissions policy in the same function, and the repair missed the pre-existing-file case. The suggested remediation replaces the predictable path with a uniquely created temporary file and an explicit permission change before the rename.

What to check

What stays unknown

Neither advisory claims exploitation in the wild, and neither should be read as claiming it. The token advisory shows the mechanism firing in gh-aw's own smoke run, which is evidence the bug was live, not evidence anyone harvested the fragments. Treat both as patch-first findings: upgrade, recompile, and check your public artifacts, in that order.

Limits

Related playbooks

Sources

Back to: Coding playbooks hub · Also: GitHub Agentic Workflows are generally available · A malicious MCP server can probe for your credentials · Audit the agent plugins installed on your machine